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INTRODUCTION

Under what circumstances does entrustment operate to sever a
secured party's rights in collateral? Consider how the Uniform
Commercial Code, applies to the following situations. Suppose Ed
takes his bicycle to Merv, a bicycle dealer, for repairs, but instead
of making repairs Merv sells the bicycle to Betty. Who now owns
the bicycle? Section 2-403(2) states that "[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business." 2 Ed has entrusted3 possession of
goods' to Merv, a merchant 5 dealing in goods of that kind'. Assuming Betty is a buyer in the ordinary course of business (BIOC),
Merv now has the power to transfer all of Ed's rights in the bicycle
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE OFFICIAL TEXT (9th ed. 1978) (hereinafter
cited as U.C.C.; other editions are cited by date of draft).
2. U.C.C. § 2-403(3) defines entrusting. See infra text accompanying note 18.

3. Id.
4. "[AIll things . .. movable at the time of identification to the contract
." U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
5. A "person who deals in goods of the kind ... " U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
6. See U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2.
7. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9). For simplicity, "BIOC" is used in place of "buyer in
ordinary course of business".
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to Betty. Betty now owns the bicycle, and Ed cannot validly assert
any ownership claim against her. Ed's only remedies would be
against Merv.
Next, assume that Merv, the bicycle dealer, buys a bicycle for
his inventory, borrowing money from Sam to buy it and granting
Sam a perfected security interest in the bicycle. Without Sam's authorization,8 Merv sells the bicycle to Betty. This transaction
raises the question of whether Sam can validly assert his security
interest in the bicycle against Betty. Section 9-306(2) provides the
answer-it states "[eixcept where this Article otherwise provides,
a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange, or other disposition . . . . Section 9-307, designated by
section 9-306 comment 3 as one of the places where Article 9 "otherwise provides," allows a "buyer in ordinary course of business
• . . [to take] free of a security interest created by his seller even
though the security interest is perfected and even though the
buyer knows of its existence." 10 Assuming again that Betty is a
BIOC, she takes the bicycle free of the security interest created by
her seller, Merv. Sam cannot now validly assert his security interest in the bicycle against Betty.
So far the U.C.C. provides clear answers to the questions
raised. Consider however, one last example where the answer is not
so clear.1" Suppose in the first example that Sam owned a perfected 2 security interest in Ed's bicycle at the time of Ed's entrustment to Merv, the dealer. Without Sam's authorization, Merv
now sells the bicycle to Betty in the ordinary course of business. As
explained by Professors White and Summers,1 3 under Article 2 the
rights of the BIOC, Betty, are superior to those of the entruster,
8. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). If Sam authorized the sale, he could not assert his
security interest after disposition of the collateral.
9. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (emphasis added).
10. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (emphasis added). This section actually applies only to
a BIOC "other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations." Id. This farm products exception to the protection of the
BIOC under U.C.C. § 9-307(1) is not within the scope of this Comment, but for a
discussion of the topic see Dugan, Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section
9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 U. COLO. L. REv. 333, 337-45 (1975).
11. This example is based on the example in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 25-15, at 1074-75 (2d ed. 1980).

12. Also assume that Sam filed a financing statement covering the bicycle
prior to the sale to Betty. Otherwise U.C.C. § 9-307(2) could under certain circumstances sever the security interest. See infra note 113.
13. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 1074-75.
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Ed. The more difficult problem, however, is in deciding which part
of the U.C.C. governs the rights of the secured party, Sam, versus
those of the BIOC, Betty. Does the solution lie in Article 9 or section 2-403 or both? Under Article 9, the buyer does not qualify for
the BIOC exception of section 9-307(1) as in the second situation
above because the security interest was not created by the BIOC's
seller; therefore, the security interest should continue in the collateral. Under Article 2, however, the BIOC might take free of the
security interest in the entrusted goods under section 2-403(2) because Merv appears to have the power to transfer the ownership
rights in the bicycle. When both Articles of the U.C.C. apply to the
same factual situation, what is the outcome?" The U.C.C. is far
from explicit on this question, and consequently more than one
school of thought has emerged to give an answer.
This Comment surveys the different theories used by courts to
interpret the U.C.C. in settling disputes between Article 9 and section 2-403(2)." It also looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the
theories proposed and suggests a solution. 16 For the sake of simplicity, the conflict of ownership claims of the BIOC under section
2-403(2) versus those of the secured party under Article 9 will be
referred to in this Comment as the entrustment problem.

II.

ENTRUSTMENT UNDER SECTION

2-40317

Section 2-403(3) defines entrusting as:
includ[ing] any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties
14. This problem has been recognized for quite some time:

In several instances where the articles overlap, with inconsistent rules
applicable to the same case [including the overlap of U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2)
and 9-307(1)], the text of the Code promulgated in 1952 failed to state
clearly which rule governed, or failed to remove transactions regulated by
one article from the operation of the other.
STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, Report and Appendices Relating to
the Uniform Commercial Code (Legislative Document No. 65A) at 31 (1956).
15. For earlier discussions of U.C.C. § 9-307(1), see Dugan, supra note 10;
Sexton, Section 9-307(1) of the UCC: The Scope of the Protection Given a Buyer
in Ordinary Course of Business, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 985 (1968).
16. Cases involving unperfected security interests are not within the scope of
this Comment.
17. This section of the Comment does not purport to be a comprehensive
study of entrustment. Rather, it seeks only to introduce the reader to the doctrine
of entrustment. For a more in-depth discussion of entrustment, see, e.g., Leary &
Sperling, The Outer Limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. REV. 50 (1981).
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to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the
goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law. 8
The rule allowing a merchant to whom goods have been entrusted
to give better title than he has received evolved from the 19th century days of the Factor's Acts 9 in England and the United States.
The Factor's Acts, in turn, evolved from common law principles of
agency. Entrusting situations which fall within the purview of section 2-403(3) come in a myriad of forms.2 0 "Any entrusting by a
bailor" 2' is one such type. Courts often find entrusting when a
buyer leaves purchased goods in the hands of his seller,22 but they
do not always agree that entrusting exists when a secured creditor
allows the debtor to retain possession of the goods.2 3 One court has
held that entrustment could not occur when the secured party retained a negotiable warehouse receipt covering the goods, because
the receipt, in effect, gave the secured creditor possession.2 4 Some
18. U.C.C. § 2-403(3).
19. See BLACKBURN, CONTRACT OF SALE 307-20 (2d ed. 1887); Gilmore, The
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase,63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954); Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1962). See also U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 1.
20. For North Carolina cases dealing with U.C.C. § 2-403(2)-(3) see infra text
accompanying notes 149-53.
21. U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 2.
22. See infra discussion of these cases: Executive Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pagel,
238 Kan. 809, 715 P.2d 381 (1986) (note 148); Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v.
Bates, 154 Ga. App. 71, 267 S.E.2d 469 (1980) (notes 84-102 and accompanying
text); In re Tom Woods Used Cars, Inc., 21 Bankr. 560 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (notes
122-25 and accompanying text).
23. Compare Rex Fin. Corp. v. Marshall, 406 F. Supp. 567 (D. Ark. 1976) (no
entrusting when secured party allowed debtor, a mobile home dealer, to retain
possession of homes); Adams v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d
26 (Okla. 1977) (secured party did not entrust car to debtor; however, debtor entrusted to his employer-see infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case); Muir v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 108 N.J. Super. 586, 262 A.2d
33 (1970) (no entrusting when assignee of security interest allowed buyer of used
car to retain possession); with In re Woods, 25 Bankr. 924 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (entrusting of car-see infra discussion at notes 137-40 and accompanying text);
Matteson v. Harper, 66 Or. App. 31, 672 P.2d 1219 (1983), rev'd, 297 Or. 113, 682
P.2d 766 (1984) (entrusting of bulldozer-see infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text for a discussion); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 78 N.C. App. 1,
336 S.E.2d 666 (1985) (entrusting of car-see infra discussion at note 151 and
accompanying text).
24. Hendries, Inc. v. American Express Co., 35 A.D.2d 412, 316 N.Y.S.2d 554
(App. Div. 1970), appeal dismissed, 29 N.Y.2d 546, 324 N.Y.S.2d 92, 272 N.E.2d
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courts suggest that the entrustment doctrine should not apply in
sales of certain collateral such as used automobiles,"" because the
BIOC should know that there is a certificate of title outstanding to
provide notice of security interests.
Why does the doctrine of entrustment exist? The common law
favored the original owner of chattels over any person who purchased the owner's chattels without the owner's consent. This policy often led to grossly unfair results, at least from the perspective
of the innocent good faith purchaser. It also restricted the
merchantability of goods in the stream of commerce. The drafters
of the U.C.C. in Article 2 wished to facilitate the smooth flow of
commerce, thereby advancing Gilmore's "commercial doctrine" of
sales law,2 6 so they offered protection to the innocent good faith
purchaser in the commercial setting 7 by creating the entrustment
provisions of section 2-403(2)-(3).
In addition to requiring an entrustment of possession of goods,
section 2-403(2) also places two requirements on the good faith
purchaser, both of which focus on the status of the parties involved
in the transaction. First, the person selling the goods must be a
"merchant dealing in goods of that kind."" The U.C.C. does not
define merchant dealing in goods of that kind, but its definition of
581 (1971). In Hendries, a bank issued an irrevocable letter of credit to finance
the debtor's purchase of imported goods, receiving a negotiable warehouse receipt
covering the goods. The debtor contracted to sell to buyers goods of the same
brand as those covered by the receipt, but went bankrupt before delivering all of
the goods to the buyers. The court held that no entrustment occurred between
the bank and debtor because delivery of the receipt gave the bank possession.
25. Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600
(1961) (purchaser of a used car expects production of a certificate of title at the
time of sale); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Associates Discount Corp., 246 Ark. 118,
436 S.W.2d 809 (1969) (a used-car entrustment case citing Grimes for the same
proposition).
26. Gilmore, supra note 11, at 1057. The doctrine protects the good faith
purchaser "not because of his praiseworthy character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property by one who offers it for
sale or to secure a loan." Id.
27. Or, more precisely, the BLOC. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) already protects the noncommercial bona fide purchaser.
28. U.C.C. § 2-104(1). This section lists two other types of merchants: a person who holds himself out as having special knowledge with respect to the goods
involved or one to whom such knowledge is attributed because of his use of an
intermediary possessing such knowledge.
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merchant does include "a person who deals in goods of the kind."29
Section 2-104 comment 2 implies that these terms are synonymous. 30 Second, section 2-403(2) requires the purchaser of the
goods to be a "buyer in ordinary course of business." The BIOC is
essentially a good faith purchaser buying in ordinary course from a
seller of goods of that kind.3"
What is the consequence of a BIOC buying entrusted goods
from a merchant dealing in goods of that kind? The U.C.C. gives
the seller power to transfer to the buyer all rights of the entruster.3 2 This provision means that when the entruster has full
title to the goods, as in the first example above, the merchant/
seller (who has no title at all) can actually transfer better title than
he had himself, thereby protecting the buyer from the owner's
claims to the property. The original owner retains no claim against
the innocent buyer and may look only to the merchant/seller for
relief.
III.

ARTICLE

9:

THE SECURED PARTY'S RIGHTS UPON DISPOSITION
OF COLLATERAL

When a security interest arises under Article 9, the general
rule is that it "continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange, or other disposition thereof. . . -33 This rule protects se-

cured parties, but it has exceptions which arise when "Article [9]
otherwise provides.

3

4

For purposes of analyzing entrustment cases

in light of Article 9, only two of the exceptions are pertinent."
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2 explains that this definition of merchant includes "a much smaller group than everyone who is engaged in business and requires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods."
31. U.C.C. § 1-201(9). The following conditions preclude BIOC status: a
buyer who has knowledge that the sale of goods violates a third party's security
interest or ownership rights; a seller who is a pawnbroker; a transfer in bulk; a
transfer which is security for a money debt; or a transfer in satisfaction of a
money debt. Id. But note that a "merchant dealing in goods of that kind" who
otherwise qualifies may enjoy BIOC status. See Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc.,
36 A.D.2d 6, 317 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div. 1971) (car dealer who fit BIOC definition of § 1-201(9) took car free of a security interest created by his seller).
32. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
33. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
34. Id.
35. See infra note 113 for a brief discussion of the limited U.C.C. § 9-307(2)
consumer goods exception. For other exceptions to the general rule of U.C.C. § 9306(2), see Dugan, 46 U. COLO. L. REv. 333 n.2 (1975).
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A security interest does not continue in collateral if the secured party authorizes disposition of the collateral and the debtor
subsequently disposes of it." Three factors support this rule. First,
though Article 9 protects a secured creditor from the loss of his
security interest resulting from the disposition of collateral which
comes as a surprise, his authorization of the disposition precludes
the possibility of unfair surprise. Second, if the secured creditor
authorizes disposition, he expects buyers to buy, and cannot expect
buyers to purchase goods subject to his security interest. Finally,
the secured creditor may have a continued security interest in the
37
proceeds from the disposition.
Section 9-307(1) presents a second and more narrow exception
to the rule of continuous security interests. This exception gives
protection to the BIOC, 8 who "takes free of a security interest created by his seller . . . -"I Section 9-307(1) severs the security interest even if it is perfected 0 and "even though the buyer knows of
its existence."4' 1 The U.C.C. states that section 9-307(1), read in
conjunction with the definition of BIOC in section 1-201(9), allows
a buyer to take free of the interest if he "merely knows that there
is a security interest which covers the goods but [the BIOC] takes
subject [to the security interest] if he knows, in addition, that the
sale ' 42 violates some condition of the security agreement. Apparently, when the buyer knows the purchase will violate a security
agreement covering the goods, he loses his status as a BIOC and
will not take free of the security interest. Courts often interpret
the language "by his seller" in section 9-307(1) literally, construing
it to sever a security interest created by the buyer's immediate
seller,4 but not to sever a security interest created by someone
other than the BIOC's immediate seller.4" The purpose of the sec36. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
37. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
38. Recall the farm products exception to U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See supra note
10.
39. U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 2.
43. See, e.g., In re Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982) (BIOC
took airplanes free of security interest created by his seller, an airplane dealer);
Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 36 A.D.2d 6, 317 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div.
1971); Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961).
44. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Bates, 154 Ga. App. 71, 267
S.E.2d 469 (1980); Executive Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pagel, 238 Kan. 809, 715 P.2d 381
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tion 9-307(1) exception is to ensure the merchantability' 5 of goods
by protecting buyers from "floor plan" inventory financing of dealers. Although courts know that the danger to the BIOC of a continuing security interest exists when a more remote seller creates
the security interest," they apparently do not interpret the U.C.C.
as drafted to provide protection to the BIOC in that situation.

IV.
A.

RECONCILING SECTION

2-403

WITH ARTICLE

9

The Prevailing Article 9 Secured Creditor

One school of thought dealing with the entrustment problem
favors the secured creditor under section 9-307(1), rather than the
BIOC under section 2-403(2). Though this view has support from
both commentators' 7 and courts, its proponents do not always use
the same line of reasoning to reach their common conclusion.
Nevertheless, one theory predominates among courts favoring
the secured party.48 Courts adopting this theory interpret "power
to transfer all rights of the entruster" 9 to mean that the buyer
takes whatever rights the entruster had, which at best exists as an
equity interest subject to any outstanding security interests.
Courts following this approach generally give only sparse analysis
to support their conclusions, but the factual settings in the cases
illustrate a variety of situations involving both security interests
and section 2-403(2). Exchange Bank of Osceola v. Jarrett" is one
of the simpler situations. The debtor in Jarrettpurchased a tractor-scraper through a Florida bank and gave the bank a perfected
(1986); Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Goodman, 24 Cal. App. 3d 131, 100 Cal. Rptr.
763, (1972); Lindsley v. Financial Collection Agencies, Inc., 97 Misc.2d 263, 410
N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
45. See Gilmore, supra note 19.
46. See infra text accompanying note 54.
47. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11.
48. See Adams v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, 565 P.2d 26 (Okla.
1977); Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Bates, 154 Ga. App. 71, 267 S.E.2d 469
(1980); American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248 (5th
Cir. 1981); Exchange Bank of Osceola v. Jarrett, 180 Mont. 33, 588 P.2d 1006
(1979) all of which are discussed infra. See also Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles
-World Marketing, Inc., 46 Bankr. 458 (D. Mass. 1985). Although entrusting was
not at issue, the court stated that "even if general law principles or Article 2
would permit him to replevy the goods from the secured party, he could only take
them subject to the prior security interest," id. at 462, thus hinting that Article 9
would control any conflict between Article 2 and Article 9.
49. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
50. 180 Mont. 33, 588 P.2d 1006 (1979).
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security interest in the tractor. The debtor then sold it to an Iowa
farm implement dealer who resold it to a Montana BIOC. Under
these facts, section 9-307(1) did not save the BIOC from the security interest because a remote seller had created it,51 so the BIOC
sought protection under section 2-403(2). The Jarrett court determined that entrustment occurred when the debtor sold the tractorscraper to the Iowa dealer, but it also held that the BIOC lost
under section 2-403. The extent of the court's section 2-403 analysis was its statement that "[t]he emphasized language of [section
2-403(2)]52 disposes of [the BIOC's] alternative claim. '53 The court
further "recognize[d] that this [was] a harsh result,"54 but held
that any further action on the issue should be taken by the legislature.55 The court failed to suggest how or why the legislature
should clarify the law on this issue.
American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co.56 was
a "complicated diversity case [in which the court] attempt[ed] to
resolve the competing claims of various parties to an expensive
piece of coal mining equipment . . . sold more than once by the
same dealer. ' 57 After sifting through agency issues the court ad-

dressed the entrustment issue. Studying the four standard fact
patterns which Professors White and Summers say constitute entrustment,58 the court determined that "the case at bar [did] not
seem to fit neatly within any one of these categories." 5 9 Nevertheless, according to the court, entrustment may occur under facts
51. Id. at 38, 588 P.2d at 1009. The court relied on the "landmark" decision
of National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Jones, discussed infra at notes 103-12
and accompanying text to reach this result.
52. The language emphasized by the court was: "gives him power to transfer
all rights of the entruster . ... "
53. 180 Mont. at 38, 588 P.2d at 1009.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 643 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 250.
58. Professors White and Summers list four common entrustment situations
in which the BIOC prevails over the entruster:
[1] Ernie Entruster turns his car over to Dave Dealer so that Dave can
sell it for Ernie . . . . [2] [A] wholesaler gives Dealer the goods 'on consignment' or under a 'floor planning' agreement . . . . [3] George leaves
goods to be repaired with Dealer who resells them to a buyer in ordinary
course . . . . [4] Edgar buys goods from Dealer but leaves the goods in
Dealer's hands.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 3-11, at 143.
59. 643 F.2d at 269.
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other than the four common situations, as long as there is "any
delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession."6 Concluding that the trial court could resolve the entrustment issue on
remand,"' the court addressed the crucial issue of what rights the
entruster may transfer to the BIOC. Citing Jarrett,the court held
that entrustment does not destroy a security interest unless the
secured party is the entruster 2 in which case the merchant dealing
in goods of that kind can transfer all rights of the secured party to
the BIOC. This brief statement was the extent of the court's resolution of the entrustment problem."'
In Adams v. City National Bank,"" an Oklahoma case, a car
dealer assigned a car's title to one of its salesmen. The salesman
then procured a loan from the bank, and granted the bank a perfected security interest 6 in the car. The car dealer subsequently
sold the car to a BIOC, obtaining reassignment of the title from
the salesman and delivering title to the BIOC. The bank then tried
to assert its security interest against the BIOC. Finding that the
salesman entrusted possession of the car to the car dealer," the
court stated that under section 2-403(2), "[t]he transaction gave
[the BIOC] the same title [held by the salesman, or entruster],
which was title subject to the bank's security interest. Bank's security interest [was] still intact under section 2-403(2). " 67 The
BIOC's only recourse was to seek protection under the section 9307(1) exception. It appeared that the court would favor the secured creditor because the security interest was created not by the
BIOC's seller (the car dealer) but by a more remote party, the
salesman.
The Adams court, however, looked to an earlier Oklahoma
case, Idabel National Bank v. Tucker," which held "against a se60. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-403(3)).
61. Id. at 272.
62. Id. at 270.
63. But the court did give a good discussion of how agency and estoppel principles may operate to bar a secured party's rights against a BIOC-a topic outside
the scope of this Comment which may, if applicable, nevertheless be an important
consideration for the BIOC in winning a struggle against remote security
interests.
64. 565 P.2d 26 (Okla. 1977).
65. "Oklahoma does not require a security interest to be recorded on the certificate of title in order for it to be perfected." Id. at 28 n.1.
66. Id. at 29.
67. Id.
68. 544 P.2d 1287 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975). In Tucker, the BIOC prevailed over
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cured party in favor of a buyer of an automobile
Tucker the court stated:

"69

In

Ordinarily, when a person goes into a merchant's place of business to make a purchase . . . the purchaser ought to have the
right to assume that the merchant has a right to sell the commodity in question and should not be required to make a record
search before purchasing or to see to it that the merchant obtains
a valid release of the item from a bank floor plan before deliver70
ing it to the purchaser and receiving his money or obligation.
The Adams court considered the issue of an agency " relationship
between the car dealer and its salesman, then agreed with Tucker
and Texas National Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide7 2 that the
BIOC should be protected. Accordingly, it decided that the car
dealer and the salesman were the same entity for the purpose of
deciding who created the security interest. 7" Therefore, under section 9-307(1) the BIOC was protected from the secured party's
claim since the court deemed the car dealer, rather than its salesman, to have created the security interest. This case is somewhat
peculiar in that the BIOC prevailed over the secured creditor even
though the court held that Article 9 rather than section 2-403(2)
governed the entrustment problem. In light of Oklahoma precedent favoring the BIOC when the actual entrustment problem
arose,7 4 it seems probable that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
would have favored the BIOC in this case even if the court were
unable to apply the section 9-307(1) exception.
One case utilizing the theory that the BIOC takes no more
than the entruster had goes beyond the sparse analysis of earlier
cases, but the court's reasoning has only limited application. Sethe secured party under U.C.C. § 9-307 because the BIOC's immediate seller created the security interest.
69. Adams, 565 P.2d at 31.
70. 544 P.2d at 1291 (quoting Texas Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Aufderheide,
235 F. Supp. 599, 604 (E.D. Ark. 1964)).
71. "The Uniform Commercial Code has not changed the law in this state
regarding clothing an agent with apparent authority to convey title, especially if
the agent is one who ordinarily deals in the goods which the principal has entrusted to him." 565 P.2d at 30-31 (quoting Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457
P.2d 548, 550 (Okla. 1969)). See also supra note 63.
72. 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964).
73. Adams, 565 P.2d at 31.
74. See Tulsa Auto Dealers Auction v. North Side State Bank, 431 P.2d 408
(Okla. 1966); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Law, 564 P.2d 240 (Okla. 1977). Both cases
are discussed infra at note 148.
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curity Pacific National Bank v. Goodman7 5 involved a classic entrustment situation.7" The debtor granted a perfected security interest in a boat, then delivered the boat plus a "power of attorney"
to a merchant dealing in goods of that kind. The merchant then
sold the boat to the BIOCs. When the merchant went into insolvency, the secured creditor repossessed the boat." Though the
court noted that a "purpose underlying section [2-403] is to protect
78 it
the merchantability of goods in the possession of a dealer,
held against the BIOCs because they "had a simple and effective
means of determining whether any security interest was outstanding [by checking] the public records of the [California] State Department of Harbors and Watercraft."' 7" This reasoning-that the
buyers could and should have checked such "public records" for
notice of liens-is valid only when the existence of outstanding
liens is easily verified. Such a situation would arise when the collateral is a vehicle with a title governed by a certificate of title
statute requiring notation of a security interest on the certificate
itself for perfection. The court did not address the situation in
which liens are not readily verifiable.
The buyers in Goodman could possibly have protected themselves by checking public records or requiring the seller to allow
them to inspect the title certificate. In a sale of goods not covered
by such a statute however, the best that a potential buyer could
reasonably do is check for U.C.C. financing statements at the
courthouse of the proper county.81 Such a search, however, would
reveal only security interests created by the BIOC's immediate
seller. It would be highly unlikely for security interests created by
a more remote seller to surface, because the potential buyer would
check only records indexed under his immediate seller's name.
Therefore, a potential buyer searching records for goods not subject to a certificate of title statute could not adequately protect
himself from these remotely created security interests. As stated
earlier, the courts will generally interpret the "created by his
75. 24 Cal. App. 3d 131, 100 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1972).
76. J. WrrrE & R. SUMMERS § 25-15, at 1074-75.
77. And, as an added twist to the case, the secured creditor redelivered the
boat to the debtor who paid off the loan and resold the boat to another party. 24
Cal. App. 3d at 134, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
78. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
79. Id. at 141, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
80. See U.C.C. § 9-302(3).
81. Or wherever U.C.C. § 9-401 designates as the proper place for filing.
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seller" exception of section 9-307(1) to exclude protection of a
BIOC in such a situation.8 2 The Goodman court could have clarified its position if it had distinguished the two types of situations
and held that Article 9, rather than section 2-403(2), governs only
in entrustment situations such as those involving goods covered by
a certificate of title statutes ' in which a prospective buyer can
readily check the certificate for notations indicating security interests created by any seller, not just his immediate seller.
Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. Bates" also interprets
section 2-403(2) as permitting a merchant dealing in goods of that
kind to transfer no better title than that of the entruster. In Bates,
a tractor dealership, through its employee, sold a tractor to the
debtor. The dealership assigned its security interest in the tractor
to another party who perfected the interest. The debtor, who had
not yet taken possession of the tractor, then leased it back to the
employee. Later, the tractor dealership sold the tractor to a
BIOC.8 5 The Bates decision contains not one, but three reasons
that explain why the secured creditor prevails over the BIOC.
First, relying on Adams v. City National Bank, the court held that
the BIOC acquired the same rights as the entruster-an equity interest subject to a security interest. Second, the court characterized the entrustment provisions of section 2-403 as merely a "precisely limited exception to the common law rule that the seller can
convey no greater title than he has himself."8 Third, and most
82. See supra note 44. But courts are usually generous in finding that entrustment exists in "titled" goods, such as automobiles, despite any non-delivery
of title papers. See, e.g., Couch v. Cockroft, 490 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972)
(entrustment of car notwithstanding non-delivery of title certificate); Medico
Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1969) (same). See also Godfrey v. Gilsdorf, 476 P.2d 3 (Nev. 1970), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 141-48.
83. Or in other appropriate situations under U.C.C. § 9-302(3).
84. 154 Ga. App. 71, 267 S.E.2d 469 (1980).
85. Although both the debtor and the secured party argued that the debtor
did not entrust the tractor to the dealer, but entrusted it to [the dealer's
employee] in his private capacity as a pond-digger, without knowledge
that it would find its way back to the dealer, and that therefore [the
debtor] did not entrust "possession of [the] goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind". . . [the court found] it unnecessary to determine whether [the debtor] entrusted the tractor to [the employee] individually, to the dealer, or to [the employee] as an agent of the dealer.
Id. at 73, 267 S.E.2d at 471.
86. Id. at 74, 267 S.E.2d at 472 (citing Simson v. Moon, 137 Ga. App. 82, 222
S.E.2d 873 (1975)).
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convincingly, the court injected section 9-30611 into the case, holding that section 2-403 "does not, expressedly or even impliedly, abrogate the clear intent of [section 9-306] providing for the continuation of [the secured party's] perfected security interest."8 8
The first of these theories has already been examined in the
cases discussed above. As noted, the courts have given sparse analysis to the reasoning found in Adams, possibly because the wording of section 2-403(2) is so straightforward, allowing easy disposal
of a case involving a complex U.C.C. problem. The second theory
used in Bates shows the court's awareness of common law rules,
which under certain circumstances may supplement the U.C.C. s '
The court's assertion, however, that entrustment is merely a "precisely limited exception to the common law rule" 90 may be an improper characterization of section 2-403. The entrustment provisions are more properly an abrogation of, rather than an exception
to, the common law rule that one may transfer no better title than
he has himself.91 This is especially true in light of the U.C.C. policy
of "simplify[ing], clarify[ing] and moderniz[ing] the law governing
commercial transactions."9 2 Section 2-403 applies Professor Gilmore's commercial theory9s to transactions of goods in a truly commercial setting," the goal of which is to "facilitat[e] the ready exchange of goods in the market place."'9 When coupled with the
mandate of liberal construction set out in section 1-102(1), 9 , the
87. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) states "[e]xcept where this Article otherwise provides, a
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding ...

disposition" (unless

authorized by the secured party).
88. 154 Ga. App. at 74, 267 S.E.2d at 472.
89. U.C.C. § 1-103 states "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of
this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions."

See also U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 1.
90. 154 Ga. App. at 74, 267 S.E.2d at 472.
91. See, e.g., Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305 (1882), holding that an entrusting of
possession of goods to a merchant dealing in such goods did not give the merchant
power to transfer ownership. The court stated: "If it were otherwise people would
not be secure in sending their watches or articles of jewelry to a jeweler's establishment to be repaired or cloth to a clothing establishment to be made into garments." Id. at 315.
92. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a).
93. See Gilmore, supra note 19, at 1062 n.14.
94. W. Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 469 (1963).
95. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Law, 564 P.2d 240, 243 (Okla. 1977), (discussed
infra at note 148).
96. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) states "[tihis Act shall be liberally construed and ap-
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entrustment provisions are not merely a "precisely limited exception" but rather a catalyst allowing goods to flow freely into the
stream of commerce. The Bates "limited exception" strict construction approach therefore contradicts the liberal U.C.C. policy.
However, there remains the third and strongest of the Bates'
arguments in favor of the secured creditor, the section 9-306 theory. Despite the underlying U.C.C. policy favoring merchantability
of goods, section 9-306(2) provides that a security interest continues 9 7 in collateral 8 following disposition "[e]xcept where this Article otherwise provides."' 99 Nowhere does Article 9 explicitly provide
that entrustment under section 2-403(2) extinguishes a security interest in collateral.1 00 Therefore, unless some provision within Article 9101 implicitly "otherwise provides," entrustment should not destroy a perfected Article 9 security interest. The section 9-306(2)
argument proposed in Bates is perhaps the strongest in favor of
the secured creditor. Likewise, it is the most difficult to refute because of the straightforward language of section 9-306(2). This
Comment's later discussion of cases in which entrustment severs
the security interest will reveal the strength of this argument.
None of these cases directly confront the first clause of section 9306(2). Apparently, the BIOC can prevail under section 9-306(2)
only if the court interprets a secured party's acquiescence in delivery to and possession by a merchant dealing in goods of that kind
to constitute authorization of the sale, thereby avoiding applica10 2
tion of the section 9-306(2) theory.
National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Jones0 3 is one of the
earliest and most frequently cited cases in this area, although the
case uses a somewhat weaker argument found in Article 2 to rule
plied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
97. Unless the disposition was authorized.
98. Or in identifiable proceeds.
99. Professor Dugan explains that some provisions lying outside Article 9
(e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 7-205) apply to extinguish the security interest through
express cross-reference or through interarticle priority references. Dugan, supra
note 10, at 333 n.2.
100. With respect to application of the interarticle priority reference of
U.C.C. § 2-403(4) to sever the secured party's interest, see In re Woods, 25 Bankr.
924 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), discussed infra at notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
See also supra note 99.
101. Or outside Article 9 if incorporated by cross-reference or by an interarticle priority reference.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 137-40.
103. 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967).
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in favor of the secured party. The case involved a car dealer who
sold an automobile to the debtor on a retail installment contract,
with the car dealer assigning the security interest to a bank which
perfected by filing pursuant to section 9-401. The debtor then
"traded or sold" 104 the car to a used-car dealer, who subsequently
sold it to a BIOC. The court's discussion referred to subsection 1 of
section 2-403,1°' but not to subsections 2 or 3.106 It is unclear from
the opinion why the court failed to address the issue of entrustment since the facts strongly suggest that the debtor entrusted the
car to the used-car dealer, a merchant dealing in goods of that
kind. In any event, the brief analysis of Shawmut gave three arguments in favor of the secured party. First, the court propounded
the section 9-306(2) theory stated above-that the secured creditor's rights are preserved against the BIOC because section 2403(2) is not one in which Article 9 provides that a security interest fails to continue in collateral.
The court grounded its second theory in the words of section
2-402(3)(a), which states that "[n]othing in [Article 21 shall be
deemed to impair the rights of creditors of the seller under the
provisions of.

.

. (Article 9)." The BIOC in Shawmut was not pro-

tected under section 9-307(1) because the security interest was not
created by his seller. Had the court gone one step further and labelled the transaction between the debtor and used-car dealer an
entrustment, 0

7

the BIOC would have remained

unprotected

against the secured creditor because of the court's reliance on section 2-402(3)(a). But should the secured creditor prevail over the
section 2-403 BIOC under section 2-402(3)(a)? A second look at
section 2-402(3) reveals that the provision speaks only of not impairing "rights of creditors of the seller." The problem in Shawmut
comes in the definition of seller in section 2-402(3). The court ap104. Id. at 387, 236 A.2d at 485.
105. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) states:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had
power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires
rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for
value..

..

For a discussion of § 2-403(1), see Warren, supra note 94.
106. 108 N.H. at 389, 236 A.2d at 486.
107. In the alternative, the court could have determined that the bank (as
secured party) entrusted the car to the debtor by virtue of the bank's acquiescence in the debtor's retention of possession of the car. See supra the discussion
accompanying notes 22-25.
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parently interpreted seller to mean the party granting the security
interest-the debtor. Therefore the bank, as a creditor of the
seller, prevailed against the BIOC. However, if "seller" means the
BIOC's seller, or the used-car dealer, then it is not clear whether
section 2-402(3) applies to a remote seller's creditors such as the
bank in Shawmut. The U.C.C. definitions of creditor'0 8 and
seller'0 9 do not offer any guidance as to whether the remote secured creditor's rights may be severed. Comment 1 to section 2-103
mentions "any legal successor in interest" of the seller, stating that
this phrase (which is found in the prior Uniform Sales Act) has
been omitted from the U.C.C., and that "[iln every ordinary case,
however, such successors are as of course included""' in the definition. The next question is whether "creditors of the seller" is such
an "ordinary case" under the comment. In other words, is "seller"
in section 2-402(3) considered the BIOC's immediate seller (the
used-car dealer in Shawmut), the initial seller (the car dealer), or
the whole chain of sellers (including the debtor) in an entrustment
situation? The Shawmut court should have supported the section
2-402(3)(a) pro-secured party theory by stating that creditors of
the "seller" in section 2-402(3)(a) include the entire chain of sellers, from the car dealer to the BIOC.
The third argument of Shawmut is based on section 2-403(4),
which provides that the "rights of. . .lien creditors are governed
by" Articles 9, 6, and 7. According to the court, this section implies
that Article 9 rather than Article 2 governs the rights of secured
creditors in an entrusting situation. A later case, In re Woods,"'
construing this same section, disagreed with this analysis and
found in favor of the BIOC. This pro-secured party argument is
appealing at first glance, but it has limited persuasive effect because of the way the Shawmut court used the term "lien creditor."
The U.C.C. defines "lien creditor" as "a creditor who has acquired
a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like
.". M" The Shawmut court determined that section 2-403(4)
implied that the rights of any secured creditor (rather than just
the "lien creditor" as defined in section 9-301) are governed by Ar108. U.C.C. § 1-201(12).
109. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d). See also the discussion of "seller" accompanying
Godfrey v. Gilsdorf, 476 P.2d 3 (Nev. 1970) infra notes 141-47.
110. U.C.C. § 2-103 comment 1.
111. 25 Bankr. 924 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), discussed infra at notes 137-40 and
accompanying text.
112. U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
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ticle 9 in a case involving the entrustment problem. Though the
Shawmut interpretation of section 2-403(4) might be incorrect, it
is not unique. White-Sellie's Jewelry Co. v. Goodyear Co.,1 13 although not decided as an entrustment case, also alludes to section
2-403(4), stating that it "directs attention to [Article] 9 of the
Code for provisions regarding secured transactions .
*."..,
Although it is not clear which of the section 2-403 subsections were
at issue, the Goodyear court further stated that section 2-403 "concerns only a naked sale of goods and does not speak to a situation
involving goods in which is reserved a security interest."1 ' Assuming the court intended this statement to apply to section 2-403(2)(3), it is likely that an entrustment in Goodyear would not have
severed a perfected Article 9 security interest. The section 9-306(2)
argument of Shawmut supports this observation because the
Goodyear opinion referred to section 9-306(2) dealing with continuation of a security interest. 11 6
Matteson v. Harper,"" which followed the Shawmut arguments of sections 2-402(3)(a) (providing that nothing in Article 2
impairs the rights of the seller's creditors) and 9-306(2) (providing
for the continuance of perfected security interests except when Article 9 otherwise provides) found an additional reason for favoring
the secured creditor over a BIOC-the comment to section 9-101.
In Matteson, the seller sold a bulldozer to a group of buyers, and
113. 477 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). In Goodyear, the sale of two television sets from a creditor to the debtor gave the creditor a perfected security
interest: a PMSI in consumer goods. (See § 9-302(l)(d), which allows such perfection without filing a financing statement.) The debtor quickly resold the sets to X
company, a pawnbroker/retailer, who later resold them. The creditor sued X for
conversion. X, as a pawnbroker, did not qualify as a BIOC under § 1-201(9) and
therefore was not protected under § 9-307(1). X also failed to qualify for protection under § 9-307(2), because X did not purchase the sets for personal, family or
household purposes. See § 9-307(2), which states:
In the case of consumer goods, a buyer takes free of a security interest
even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security interest, for value and for his own personal, family or household purposes unless prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering such goods.
Under limited circumstances this provision is another method for severing security interests in entrusted goods.
114. 477 S.W.2d at 661.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 297 Or. 113, 682 P.2d 766 (1984), rev'g 66 Or. App. 31, 672 P.2d 1219
(1983).
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took a security interest in the bulldozer. The buyers defaulted and
delivered the bulldozer to an auctioneer. Meanwhile, the seller,
learning of the default, wrote to the auctioneer requesting him to
take a minimum bid of $22,400. However, the auctioneer sold the
bulldozer to a BLOC for $20,500 cash, keeping the proceeds and
eventually going into bankruptcy.
In Matteson, section 9-307(1) did not protect the BIOC because the BIOC's seller did not create the security interest. The
BIOC argued that he should prevail against the secured creditor
under section 2-403(2), contending that the secured creditor should
be required to police the collateral, posting notice of the security
interest at every sale. The court answered this contention with the
comment to section 9-101: "The aim of [Article 9] is to provide a
simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of
present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with
less cost and with greater certainty."'' " Requiring the secured
creditor to police the collateral "would undermine the simplicity,
uniformity and reliability of the filing system."1 '19 Deciding that
"[tihe entire issue of entrustment [was] irrelevant,"'1 0 the court
held in favor of the secured creditor, stating that he should be able
to rely on the U.C.C. filing system. 2 '
Although several theories are available to explain why entrustment does not extinguish a perfected security interest, some cases
reach this result without stating any supporting theories. In In re
Tom Woods Used Cars, Inc.,'12 2 section 9-307 did not apply be-

cause the car dealers who took back security interests from the
debtor, another car dealer, failed to execute written security agreements under section 9-203(1).123 The court explained however, that
§ 9-307 "limits the effect of § 2-403 as to entrusters who have Article 9 security interests in the entrusted goods."'2 " Woods is thus
another situation in which the secured party would apparently pre118. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment.

119. 297 Or. at 119, 682 P.2d at 769.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 119, 682 P.2d at 770.
122. 21 Bankr. 560 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
123. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) states that "a security interest is not enforceable
against the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not
attach unless. . . the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant
to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement ..
124. 21 Bankr. at 563.
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vail over the BIOC if the entrustment problem were at issue.' 1 5
Since the court did not have to reach this question, it is reasonable
that it did not give any reasons for preferring the secured party.
Several New York lower courts favoring the secured creditor
failed to reach questions that they should have addressed on the
issue of entrustment. In Lindsley v. FinancialCollection Agencies,
Inc.,'2 the facts begged for a finding of entrustment. The debtor
granted a security interest in a car, and then transferred 2 ' the car
to A, who traded it to a car dealer, who in turn sold it to a BIOC.
The court stated that "[a]ny attempt to apply UCC section 2-403
to the facts here [was] inappropriate, ' 28 but it neglected to explain why. Because the security interest in Lindsley was not created by the BIOC's seller, the BIOC did not fall under the section
9-307(1) exception and the secured creditor prevailed. The court
should either have explained why section 2-403 did not apply (by
determining that there was no entrustment under these facts) or
have explained, even if section 2-403 did apply, why the security
interest in the collateral would still continue while in the hands of
the BIOC.
The situation in Marine Midland Bank v. Smith Boys, Inc.,'12 9
was similar to that in Lindsley. The debtor granted a perfected
security interest in a boat to boat dealer A, who then assigned the
security interest. The debtor then traded the boat back to A, who
then sold it to a BIOC. The BIOC traded it to boat dealer B, who
finally sold it to another buyer. Again, these facts did not warrant
section 9-307(1) protection for the BIOC, but they did suggest a
possible entrusting under section 2-403.130 Marine Midland briefly
referred to subsection 1 of section 2-403 only, in deciding in favor
of the secured party. Though this court, like its predecessor in
Lindsley, did not address the issue of entrusting, it strongly hinted
at why entrustment would not affect a perfected security interest.
The court explained that the U.C.C. drafters intended to limit narrowly the exception to the general rule of section 9-306(2) that a
125. But see In re Woods, 25 Bankr. 924 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) discussed infra at
notes 137-40 and accompanying text in which the same bankruptcy court allowed
entrustment to sever a security interest.
126. 97 Misc. 2d 263, 410 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
127. Id. at 264, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
128. Id. at 265, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
129. 129 Misc. 2d 37, 492 N.Y.S.2d 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
130. See In re Woods, 25 Bankr. 924 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), discussed infra at
notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
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security interest continues notwithstanding disposition. Reviewing
1 the court noted that
Ocean County National Bank v. Palmer,"'
section 9-307(1) apparently did not include the language "created
by his seller" in the 1952 draft of the U.C.C., but all later versions
have. 32 This suggested that the U.C.C. drafters intended to limit
severely exceptions to section 9-306(2), which is another good theory for resolving the entrustment problem. The court added, however, that until New York passes a certificate of title act for boats,
"purchasers in this situation will have to take care to trace the
chain of title and insure the absence of any security interest by
checking filings on each and every person in the chain.' ' 3 3 This
conclusion contradicts the U.C.C. policy of "facilitating the ready
exchange of goods in the market place,' ' 3 4 and once again brings
into conflict the policies of protecting secured parties and facilitating the smooth flow of commerce.
B. The PrevailingSection 2-403 Buyer in the Ordinary Course of
Business
The opposing view, favoring the section 2-403 BIOC over the
Article 9 secured creditor in the entrustment problem, finds almost
equal support among commentators' " and courts. Again, a variety
of theories leads to a common conclusion.
First, many courts have held that the BIOC should prevail
when the secured creditor is deemed the entruster (as, for example,
when a secured creditor knows of and acquiesces in the transfer of
131. 188 N.J. Super. 509, 515-16 n.3, 457 A.2d 1225, 1229 n.3 (1983). In
Palmer, the debtor bought a boat from a boat dealer, granting a perfected security interest (later assigned to bank A). He then returned the boat to the dealer
"with the understanding that it would be sold on his behalf and the . . . lien
satisfied." Id. at 511-12, 457 A.2d at 1226. The dealer resold to two BIOCs, taking
another security interest which it later assigned to bank B. The dealer went bankrupt, failing to satisfy the first lien, and the debtor defaulted. The court, citing
Dugan, supra note 10, Sexton, supra note 15, and Commercial Credit Equip.
Corp. v. Bates, 154 Ga. App. 71, 267 S.E.2d 469 (1980) (see supra notes 84-88 and
accompanying text), held that the security interest of A took priority over that of

B.
132. Marine Midland, 129 Misc.2d at 41, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
133. Id.
134. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Law, 564 P.2d 240, 243 (Okla. 1977). See supra
text accompanying notes 89-96.
135. See, e.g., B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.4[3], at S3-37 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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This conclu-

sion is correct under section 2-403 because the entrustee/merchant
has the power to transfer the security interest ("all of the rights of
the entruster") of the secured creditor. According to In re
Woods, 3 ' it is also correct because the secured creditor's acquiescence in delivery to and possession by a merchant dealing in goods
of that kind constitutes authorization of the sale under section 9306(2). In Woods, the debtor bought a car and granted a perfected
security interest to the car dealer, who assigned the interest to another party. The debtor eventually returned the car to the dealer,.
who then resold it to a BIOC. Arguably, the entrusting was by the
debtor to the dealer, but the court determined that the assignee of
the security interest was the entruster by virtue of his knowledge
of and acquiescence in the dealer's possession of the car, which was
tantamount to authorization of the disposition. Woods could have
referred to section 9-306 comment 3 to support this argument.
Comment 3 states: "The transferee will take free whenever the disposition was authorized; the authorization may be contained in the
security agreement or otherwise given."' " Entrustment by the secured party would be considered authorization "otherwise given"
under this analysis.
Woods is an excellent example to support the view that entrustment severs security interests, because the opinion contains
two other theories aligned with this view. One is the flip side of the
section 2-403(4) argument proposed in National Shawmut Bank of
Boston v. Jones and followed by White-Sellie's Jewelry Co. v.
Goodyear Co.13 9 While Shawmut and Goodyear interpreted "lien
creditor" to encompass "all secured creditors," the Woods court
correctly pointed to the section 9-301(3) definition of "lien creditor," showing that it covers only situations involving involuntary
liens rather than the consensual Article 9 liens. Therefore, under
this analysis entrustment severs the rights of secured creditors who
do not fit the lien creditor definition.
136. E.g., Williams v. Western Surety Co., 6 Wash. App. 300, 492 P.2d 596
(1972) (floor-plan financing of mobile home). See also Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Associates Discount Corp., 246 Ark. 118, 436 S.W.2d 809 (1969); Adams v. City
Nat'l Bank of Norman, 565 P.2d 26 (Okla. 1977); American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 78 N.C. App. 1, 336 S.E.2d 666 (1985).
137. 25 Bankr. 924 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
138. U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3 (emphasis added).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
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An interarticle priority reference-section 2-403 comment
ois the basis for the third Woods theory. The court read the
language of the comment to mean that section 2-403(2) will sever a
security interest created by the BIOC's seller in every entrustment
situation except those involving farm products sold by a person engaged in farming operations. The Woods rationale is that section
2-403(2) is one of those situations under section 9-306(2) where,
through the interarticle priority scheme, Article 9 "provides otherwise." Given the comment's statement, however, that the farm
products provision of section 9-307(1) limits section 2-403(2), a
question of statutory analysis arises. Does comment 2 mean that
the farm products provision is the only rule that limits section 2403(2), or is it one of several rules limiting section 2-403(2) and
thus happens to be the only rule to which comment 2 refers? The
answer will depend on making a choice between two U.C.C. policies-promoting merchantability of goods versus protecting perfected secured parties.
One of the more complicated theories favoring the BIOC arises
from Godfrey v. Gilsdorf, 41 where the court did not have to resolve the entrustment problem but nevertheless suggested a theory
for its resolution. Gilsdorf involved a classic entrustment situation
in which the debtor granted a perfected security interest in his car,
then delivered it to a car dealer for resale. The dealer sold the car
to a BIOC and went out of business without having paid the
debtor. The entrustment problem was not at issue in Gilsdorf because the debtor paid the secured party before the case went to
trial. However, the court found entrustment between the debtor
and the car dealer, then went one step further to propose a theory
for resolving the entrustment problem. According to the court, section 2-403(2) standing alone allows the BIOC to take only the
rights of the entruster, which are at best an equity interest of the
debtor subject to a perfected security interest,1 4 2 but "sections of
the U.C.C. found elsewhere, particularly [section 2-103(1)(d)] defining 'seller,' and [section 9-307] of article 9, may be construed to
mean that [the BIOC] took the car free of the perfected security
21 4

140. U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 2 states: "As to entrusting by a secured party,
subsection (2) is limited by the more specific provisions of Section 9-307(1), which
deny protection to a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations."
141. 476 P.2d 3 (Nev. 1970).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 48-85.
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interest""' 3 of the secured party.
How does this argument work? Gilsdorf gives no explanation,
but the reasoning is probably as follows: Under section 9-307(1)
the BIOC will take free only of security interests created by his
seller. Section 2-103(1)(d) defines a seller as "a person who sells or
contracts to sell goods." If the debtor in Gilsdorf had delivered the
car to the car dealer under a consignment or other contract requiring him to sell it, then the debtor could be considered the "seller,"
and the dealer would just be a conduit through which the transaction passed. Therefore, the BIOC could take the car under section
9-307(1) free of the security interest created by "his seller," the
debtor.
This theory looks promising for the BIOC in certain situations
such as consignment-type arrangements, but it has its drawbacks.
First, what is the definition of "seller" as used in Article 9? "In
this Article" prefaces the section 2-103(1) definition, prompting
the question of whether the definition also applies to Article 9. Article 9 does not define seller, but the "definitions" section of Article 9, section 9-105, states that some definitions in other U.C.C.
articles apply to Article 9."' "Seller" is not among the definitions
listed in section 9-105(3), but "sale" as defined in section 2-106 is
applicable: 14 5 "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401)."146 Finally, the "definitional cross-references" of section 2-401 point to section 2-103
for the definition of seller. Thus, passage through a maze of U.C.C.
provisions reveals a possible escape hatch under section 9-307(1)
favoring the BIOC against a secured creditor's claim created by a
remote seller.
Unfortunately for the BIOC, the Gilsdorf theory also raises a
new line of questions. For instance, if the seller is the nonmerchant debtor who created the security interest, rather than the
car dealer/entrustee, does the buyer lose his BIOC status because
he is now deemed to have bought the goods from one who is not a
merchant dealing in goods of that kind? In other words, can the
buyer have the best of both worlds by claiming protection under
section 9-307(1) from a security interest granted by the remote
debtor because the debtor is deemed to be the seller, and yet still
143.
144.
145.
146.

476 P.2d at 6.
See U.C.C. § 9-105(3).
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
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qualify as a BIOC by virtue of having purchased from the
merchant dealing in goods of that kind? It seems to strain the
BIOC exception of section 9-307(1) for the good faith buyer to prevail by holding that both the non-merchant debtor and the
merchant/entrustee are the "seller" under different clauses of that
section, without any clear indication from the U.C.C. that this is
the proper resolution of this situation. This observation is especially true in light of the fact that the U.C.C. drafters intended to
narrowly limit this exception to section 9-306(2), as evidenced by
the omission of the "created by his seller" clause from the original
draft only.14 7 The Gilsdorf court would never have had to initiate
such a complicated theory had the U.C.C. clearly explained how to
1 48
resolve the entrustment problem.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
148. Other cases have resolved the entrustment problem in favor of the BIOC
without giving reasons or by relying on those already discussed. See Executive
Financial Servs., Inc. v. Pagel, 238 Kan. 809, 715 P.2d 381 (1986), where a tractor
dealership, a corporation managed by individuals A and B, sold tractors to the
secured party, who, without ever taking possession, "leased" the tractors back to
A and B, doing business as a partnership, with the "lease" guaranteed by the
tractor dealership. The dealership sold the tractors to three BIOCs; the partnership of A and B then defaulted. One BIOC, himself a tractor dealer, resold one of
the tractors to the defendant. The court held: (1) the "sale-leaseback" was actually an Article 9 security interest, (2) A and B as a partnership rather than the
corporate seller created the security interest, therefore U.C.C. § 9-307(1) did not
protect the BIOCs, (3) the BIOCs prevailed over the secured party, following the
holding in In re Woods, (see supra note 137). See also In re Mercury Machine
Tool & Supply Corp., 12 Bankr. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1981) where the debtor, with a
lease and option to purchase, consigned a lathe to an equipment dealer who later
went into bankruptcy. The court held: (1) the secured party prevailed over the
trustee in bankruptcy who did not have the rights of a BIOC, (2) a BIOC "would
unquestionably take free of [the] security interest." Id. at 945. However, this
court did not explain why a BIOC would "unquestionably take free." See also
Tulsa Auto Dealers Auction v. North Side State Bank, 431 P.2d 408 (Okla. 1966)
where out-of-state car dealer A sold a car through the plaintiff (an auction company) to car dealer B, who granted a security interest in the car, then sold it
through the plaintiff to car dealer C. C then sold or delivered the car back to B,
who then sold or delivered it to another secured party. The court held that the
sale from C back to B was in the ordinary course of business, thus B took the car
free of the plaintiff's security interest. See also Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Law, 564
P.2d 240 (Okla. 1977) where a secured creditor loaned funds upon debtors' false
representations of owning automobiles, and upon learning of the fraud obtained a
temporary restraining order to prevent disposition of the cars pending a suit filed
seeking imposition of a constructive trust. The debtors then sold to a BIOC. The
court, quoting § 2-403(2)-(3), ruled that the BIOC took the cars free of the security interest.
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The North Carolina View

North Carolina courts have not yet dealt with a contest between a secured creditor and the BIOC in a section 2-403 entrustment case. The seminal North Carolina entrustment case is
Toyomenka, Inc. v. Mount Hope Finishing Co. " 9 Toyomenka involved the entrustment of textile goods under section 2-403(3) between an importer and a customs broker who was hired by the importer "to enter and clear the goods through customs in the name
of [the importer] and to hold for shipping instructions."150 Section
2-403(2) did not protect the BIOC in this instance from the security interest however, since the broker was not a merchant dealing
in goods of that kind.
Two other North Carolina cases have dealt with entrusting situations involving security interests, but the security interests in
those cases were not remote; instead, the immediate sellers of the
BIOC had created them. In North Carolina National Bank v.
Robinson,1 51 the debtor (a car dealer) executed an inventory financing security agreement covering an automobile. He then sold
the car to a BIOC, and subsequently went into bankruptcy. The
BIOC prevailed against the secured creditor under section 2-403(2)
because the secured creditor was also the entruster and under section 9-307(1) because the security interest was created by BIOC's
immediate seller.
Similarly, in American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton,1 5

the

BIOC prevailed again under both sections 2-403(2) and 9-307(1).
In American Clipper, a manufacturer delivered a recreational vehicle to a dealership. The dealership sold the vehicle to a BIOC, taking and then assigning a security interest in it. When the dealership failed to pay the manufacturer, the manufacturer sought to
enforce a security interest in the vehicle against the BIOC. The
BIOC prevailed in American Clipper because the court found entrustment between the manufacturer and the dealership.
Although neither American Clipper nor Robinson actually addressed the entrustment problem, the Robinson court suggested
that entrustment could sever a perfected security interest: "the
UCC as adopted in this State protects purchasers in the ordinary
course of business from the claims of predecessors in interest who
149.
150.
151.
152.

432 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 725.
78 N.C. App. 1, 336 S.E.2d 666 (1985).
311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).
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place items into the stream of commerce without warning that
they subsequently will claim ownership."15 3 If the word "predecessors" encompasses security interests created by remote sellers,
then the BIOC should prevail in North Carolina, although there is
not yet any concrete evidence of what supporting theory a North
Carolina court would employ.
V.

CONCLUSION

In entrusting cases not involving security interests, section 2403 governs, while in secured transactions not involving entrusting,
Article 9 generally governs. In entrusting cases involving the section 2-403(2) BIOC and the remote, perfected Article 9 secured
creditor, however, the courts are split as to whose ownership rights
are superior. Those courts favoring the secured party usually employ one or more of the following arguments:
1. Under section 2-403(2) the BIOC takes "all rights of the
entruster," which is at best only the debtor's equity, subject to any
outstanding security interests.
2. The entrusting provisions of section 2-403 are a "precisely
limited exception to the common law rule that the seller can convey nogreater title than he has,"' ' which do not affect security
interests.
3. Section 9-306(2) mandates that a security interest continues
in collateral except where Article 9 otherwise provides, and section
2-403(2) is not a place where Article 9 otherwise provides; therefore the security interest is unaffected.
4. Section 2-402(3)(a) provides that nothing in Article 2 impairs the rights of the seller's creditors.
5. The language of section 2-403(4) stating that the rights of
"lien creditors" are governed by Article 9 implies that the rights of
secured creditors are also governed by Article 9, rather than Article
2, in an entrusting situation.
6. Since the original draft of the U.C.C. omitted the "created
by his seller" language now found in section 9-307(1), the drafters
intended to severely limit the exceptions to the general rule of continuity of security interests.
7. The comment to section 9-101 states that the purpose of the
U.C.C. generally, and the secured transaction provisions specifi153. 78 N.C. App. at 7, 336 S.E.2d at 670.
154. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Bates, 154 Ga. App. at 74, 267

S.E.2d at 472.
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cally, is to provide a simple and unified structure conducive to efficient financing transactions.
8. The U.C.C. policy of protecting perfected secured parties is
paramount to that of promoting merchantability of goods.
Conversely, those courts favoring the BIOC usually rely on the
following theories:
1. The U.C.C. policy of promoting merchantability of goods is
paramount to that of protecting perfected security interests.
2. Entrustment constitutes authorization under section 9306(2); therefore disposition of the collateral extinguishes the security interest.
3. Section 2-403(4) states that the rights of lien creditors only
are governed by Article 9, so that a secured creditor's rights in an
entrustment case are inferior to those of the BIOC.
4. Comment 2 to section 2-403 allows entrustment to sever a
secured creditor's interest in all situations except those involving
the sale of farm products by one engaged in farming operations.
5. Under the section 2-103(1)(d) definition of "seller," the
seller in the BIOC exception of section 9-307(1) can include a remote seller who contracts to sell to the BIOC's seller, thus severing
a remote security interest.
Reconsidering the earlier examples, the outcome of the contest
between Sam, the secured creditor, and Betty, the BIOC, over
ownership of the bicycle will depend on which theory the court follows and any additional facts, such as whether Sam knew and
agreed to entrustment by the debtor. Roughly a dozen theories apply to the question of whether entrustment severs Sam's security
interest, with a majority of the existing cases favoring the secured
creditor.
Probably the most effective solution to this entrustment problem is a clarification of the U.C.C. Section 2-403 should be modified to show that entrustment always, never or sometimes severs a
security interest. Allowing entrustment always or never to extinguish the security interest would promote one U.C.C. policy to the
exclusion of another. Perhaps there is a solution which promotes
both U.C.C. policies of protecting perfected security interests and
encouraging the merchantability of goods: allow entrustment to
sever security interests in some situations but not in others. A final
use of the earlier examples will demonstrate the answer.
Assume that Betty, the BIOC, wants to buy a bicycle from
Merv, the bicycle dealer. If the law states that entrustment can
never sever a perfected security interest, then the burden is on
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Betty as the buyer to verify that the bicycle is free from perfected
security interests, regardless of their remoteness. In the case of a
relatively low-priced bicycle, this burden is high relative to the
value of the goods. But if Sam's perfected security interest in the
bicycle were to vanish, his loss would be relatively low. Suppose,
instead of a bicycle, Betty wanted to buy a high-priced good, such
as an automobile, boat, or airplane, and Merv was an appropriate
merchant dealing in goods of that kind. This results in a much
lower burden on Betty relative to the goods' value. Consequently,
Sam has much more to lose, assuming the value of his security interest is substantial in relation to the collateral's value.
In balancing the BIOC's relative burden of verifying "clean"
title against the value of the secured creditor's interest, it is feasible that in an entrustment a perfected security interest should continue in collateral as long as the value of the security interest outweighs the BIOC's burden. When the BIOC's burden outweighs
the value of the security interest, entrustment should sever the interest. Theoretically, market forces would determine a cut-off
point at which the value of a security interest in collateral equals
the BIOC's burden of checking title. Practically, however, an artificial method must be used to separate entrustment situations in
which a security interest continues from those in which it does not.
This notifies parties of their rights in goods well before they enter
a transaction.
At least three solutions could accomplish this objective. One
solution is to fix a cut-off dollar amount, as in the U.C.C. Statute
of Frauds.1 55 A second solution is to designate specific goods in
which a perfected security interest would continue, such as "automobiles," "boats," and the like. Because most of the existing cases
involve goods subject to certificate of title legislation, the most appropriate solution is to permit perfected security interests to continue in a section 2-403 entrustment situation only if certificate of
title legislation covers the collateral. 15 6 The following provision
added to section 2-403(2) would codify this rule: "Nothing in this
section shall be deemed to impair the rights of a secured party
under provisions of Article 9 where the goods are subject to a certificate of title statute of this state." The resulting modification of
section 2-403(2) would balance the competing U.C.C. policies of
155. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
156. However, problems may still arise in interstate transactions absent a
uniform certificate of title act.
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protecting perfected security interests and promoting the merchantability of goods.
Modifying section 2-403(2) to allow entrustment to sever security interests unless the collateral is covered by certificate of title
legislation is a compromise which functions to protect perfected interests while promoting merchantability of goods. If a certificate of
title covers the goods, the BIOC must check for outstanding security interests to protect himself. If certificate of title does not apply,
section 2-403 will protect him. Conversely, the secured creditor has
a protected interest as long as a certificate of title covers the collateral; without this title certificate, he must police his debtor to protect himself. Rather than promoting one U.C.C. policy to the exclusion of the other by an all-or-nothing entrustment rule, this
give-and-take solution promotes both policies equally in a battle of
conflicting U.C.C. provisions.
John E. Cargill
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